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Globalization and the Long View
On the eve of the sixteenth century, with very little fanfare and a perilously small fleet, a
man from Genoa by way of Portugal and Spain, displaying reckless ignorance of the
course ahead, embarked on a voyage of chance that presaged a global future of political
and economic turbulence, with all the conquest and co-operation, prosperity and
inequality that have defined the modern world. As the twenty-first century dawned,
accompanied by considerably more fanfare and a great flotilla including an even ocean-
going liner, the world’s leaders sailed into Genoa from all corners of the globe—but, with
accusations of reckless ignorance traded on both sides, they were greeted by an equally
cosmopolitan mass of protesters, occasioning some of the most violent, and the first fatal,
anti-global demonstrations to date.
Not without irony, not for the first time, though rarely before with such instantly-
communicated mass impact, the 2001 G-8 summit raised the question as to how we
understand and cope with the forces of globalization set in motion five centuries before.
The Genoese gave us Columbus, and though proud of their favorite son, they were
probably amazed or baffled by his quest, and certainly unaware of the ultimate global
impact of his endeavor; amazed or baffled again as the global consequences swirled
around them on the same waterfront 500 years later, they were surely reaping far more
than they had sown, and probably felt, like many of the discontents and doubters, that
they were just an unwilling bit part caught up in a larger drama of powerful force.
Economic history is embellished by such anecdotes and reflections, but at the business
end, in its art and its science, the search causal connections, documentary evidence, and
persuasive argument often proves more elusive than finding the storytelling hooks. Only
when the theory, and the evidence, and the story fit is the work complete, and an analytic
narrative established. To try to succeed in all three areas is equal parts courageous and
foolish. Compounding the risk, the aim of this paper is to survey the history of
globalization from 1500 to the present, and so illuminate the key economic characteristics
of the modern world. In this essay I try to step back from a focus on the immediate
present and ask what the longer sweep of history can tell us about globalization, with
special reference to issues of trade and development.
Current economic challenges have not arisen out of nowhere and they have plentiful
antecedents. Is economic divergence inevitable in a globalized economy? Will trade
promote inequality? Will migration pressures increase? Are open capital markets destined
to lurch from crisis to crisis? If states cannot stop this process, can they even hope to
contain it? Should they? At a deeper, less tractable, but more fundamental level, can
nations adjust not just economically but also socially, culturally, and ideologically, to the
challenges posed by a wider world perched on their economic doorstep? The economic
historian contends that these questions cannot be fully answered by pure introspection2
and a recourse to abstract theory, or the analysis and debate of present-day events. All of
these challenges were faced by towns, cities, regions, states, and nations in the past.
Responses varied. Sometimes the outcomes were positive, sometimes not. Such variation
is of inestimable value to the social scientist: it is our only empirical evidence of the
globalization and the variation represents the closest thing to an experiment, controlled or
otherwise, in the global economic laboratory.
The Modern World: Globalization and Its Discontents
Globalization is nothing new. One might be forgiven for thinking otherwise, since so
much recent popular writing declares in sensational tones that a revolution is afoot. The
time frame of many popular, and some academic and policy studies, tends to be a few
years at most. Conclusions and policy recommendations assume that recent globalization
trends have ushered in a brave new world. The only battleground seems to be the
question of whether this is a good or bad thing.
According to the early alarmism of anti-globalists, like William Greider (One World,
Ready or Not) or John Gray (False Dawn), we subjects of globalization only dimly
perceive the economic juggernaut that is rolling over us—and we are hopelessly ill-
equipped for the devastating transformation it is wreaking because we have seen nothing
like it before. In the view of Naomi Klein (No Logo) or George Monbiot (The Captive
State) globalization threatens some combination of state weakness and corporate power
that will weaken democracy and unleash greater inequality, and even authors apparently
sympathetic to capitalist organization like Noreena Hertz (The Silent Takeover) wonder if
there should be another way. Meanwhile a few ardent neoliberal supporters like
Economist correspondents John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge (A Future Perfect)
have trenchantly defended and cheered globalization, garnering an endorsement from
Tom Peters that hails globalization as the “most powerful—and life-enhancing—force on
earth.”
It is open to question whether the experience of the past decade or two fully equips us to
answer all the questions raised by globalization and its discontents. A rapidly growing
field of new comparative economic history is only now starting to grapple with these
issues, but already we can survey some important findings of very recent literature. With
that background I will attempt to address some key concerns about trade and
globalization, especially in developing countries, as follows:
•   Economic fundamentals. When and how did the constraints of scarcity and the desire
to trade take hold? Are such forces as powerful now as in the past?
•   Institutional bases. Trade never existed in an institutional vacuum. Important
developments in legal, contractual and financial systems made a difference. What do
those events say about the limits on participation in trade today?
•   Technological shocks. Revolutions in transport and communications spurred trade.
Do serious transportation-cost constraints still inhibit development?3
•   Patterns of exchange. Exchange occurs not only in goods, but in factor markets and in
technology. How have these interacted in history? What does that say about the
possible substitutability of trade and other forms of integration today?
•   Human welfare. What have been the impacts of past globalization trends on prices,
risk, living standards, and income distribution? What does that say about the costs
and benefits of globalization today?
•   Political economy. Globalization suffers the constraints of, and imposes constraints
on, national economic policies. How has that tension been addressed in the past? How
does that speak to the future?
It first bears observing that the recent trend towards a convergence in global markets
will not necessarily yield an inevitable “End of History,” as Francis Fukuyama (1992)
called the even broader process of global convergence in many spheres, economic, social,
political and cultural. Indeed, recent events seem closer to Samuel Huntington’s brush
with futurism, “Clash of Civilizations.” But even when first proposed the “End of
History” idea had a distinctly ahistorical feel. The idea had first emerged at the end of the
nineteenth century, as the last great wave of globalization reached its peak. The view was
soon discredited after 1913 as globalization receded in the twentieth century turmoil of
wars, depressions, and the erratic course of economic policies and political philosophies
(Angell 1910).
As is now widely recognized, and as is largely taken for granted in this paper, only in the
last few years has the world made progress toward, and arguably beyond, the degree of
globalization seen a century ago. Can this trend continue, or will it face diminishing
returns or even a much talked-about backlash? And what does history have to say about
how we got here? To set the stage, just consider two benchmarks for the degree of
international market integration “then” versus “now” in two markets, goods and capital.
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Figure 1 shows the ratio of world trade to world GDP since 1800 at key benchmark dates
and the conclusion is clear: after a continuous rise during the 19
th century, trade peaked in
1913 as a fraction of world economic activity, slumped during most of the middle 20
th
century, and has revived recently, though to levels no higher than those witnessed a
century ago. Figure 2 shows the ratio of world stocks of foreign investment to GDP over
roughly the period since 1870 (data back to 1800 are incomplete, but we would guess the
ratio to be about 0.1at that point). A similar message emerges: after peaking around 1913,
the global capital market was almost quiescent for the next sixty or seventy years, before
renewed activity in the 1980s and 1990s.
2
                                                       
1 It goes without saying that labor markets are now much more restricted than a century ago, as migration is
tightly controlled. This is not to say that, despite such controls, the incentives to migrate in today’s world of
massive international income gaps do not lead to large population movement, legal or otherwise, despite
such obstacles. See Chiswick and Hatton (2002).
2 In each case the data is for selected countries for which data are available. See the discussion in the
original papers, Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).4
The Rise and Fall of Globalization: Flesh Versus Spirit
Various ingredients have developed over past centuries, and the present and past
structures of economic globalization represent a particular and time-specific alignment of
these forces. At the risk of oversimplification, an overview of this evolution of the world
economy as I will describe it is presented in Figure 3, and the story is cast as an interplay
between two kinds of forces: the economic and technological forces versus the political
and institutional forces.
On the vertical axis are the economic and technological forces that may promote
economic globalization via market integration, including the ability to transport goods or
communicate information across distances at higher speed and lower cost. These tangible
and physical elements I label “flesh.” They include new shipping or power technologies,
such as steam engines used in ships and trains, as well as new and better communication
devices such as the telegraph, telephone, or internet.
On the horizontal axis are the political and institutional forces that may reinforce or
inhibit said globalization. I call these “spirit” as a reference to the intangible quality of
the underlying thinking in which the tangible market mechanisms are embedded. At the
simplest level one can think here of trade policies, capital controls, immigration
restrictions affecting markets for goods and factors; but this dimension also includes a
broader array of legal and customary devices that provide public goods such as the
security of property rights, contract enforcement, stable and predictable monetary and
fiscal policies, and freedom from bribery, corruption, or the diversion of resources
through rent-seeking. According to this schema, and in agreement with the view that the
twentieth century has been on the whole an aberrant period of de-globalization, the
depiction in the figure claims that the history of the world economy has been far from
linear, and if anything somewhat circular. But we must set aside any temptation to get
Hegelian: we have not come full circle, nor are we likely to.
The world begins, for these purposes, in the upper left cell of the matrix in the distant
past, with both types of forces operating only weakly to promote globalization. The
technologies for integrating markets were rudimentary and the political and institutional
umbrellas covering trade were flimsy; as a result it simply cost too much (or risked too
much) to move goods or factors between distant locations. By the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, some of these forces had begun to shift, but I choose to emphasize
the institutional and political changes over the technological at this juncture: a movement
from the top left to the top right cell in the matrix. Transport and navigational
technologies had improved very little, with dogged persistence rather than innovation
permitting the fledgling opening of trade between the continents. But institutional bases
for trade did change.
The experience of this initial period, and era of what one hesitates to call proto-
globalization, was by no means uniform, and significant developments in the relationship
between states and markets conditioned the evolution of commerce and economic growth
in different locations. The big story, which scholars have explored in detail, is obviously
the rise of European trading nations and the increasing geographical scope of their5
activities, usually under state protection. In the Americas these adventures encountered
no incumbents, and in the waters and ports of Asia they increasingly crowded out local
merchants and vessels. There was a marked penetration of the Chinese long distance
trade on certain routes, an incursion that some have traced back to the failure of the
Chinese to develop their merchant ambitions after the remarkable feats of the treasure
fleet (Findlay and O’Rourke 2002).
Since the economic distances between markets remained large, there was only a very
slow increase in the level of trade and prices in different locations were highly dispersed.
But this trade flourished under very different auspices than the early trade, with an
increasing role for the state, especially powerful European states that embarked on
imperial adventures with trading companies in tow. As trade followed the flag it did so
with the benefit of an increasingly pro-economic state structure of legal protection,
financial and macroeconomic stability, and limited government predation.
One might think here primarily of the state supported trading companies like the British
and Dutch East India companies, each an exemplar of this new involvement of the state
in protecting commerce. Beyond these near monopolies, however, the general extension
of states’ economic interests beyond their own borders became an increasingly important
element of government objectives, diplomacy, and legal innovation. In addition to the
military—principally naval—strength to make this endeavor feasible, the whole exercise
rested on a significant change in state orientation.
By the eighteenth century Britain had eventually overtaken her continental rivals as the
key entrpôt in Europe, and the country eventually built up a huge flow of invisible
earnings from shipping and merchant services. Early industrialization in the 18
th century,
a force of the “flesh” would soon feed into this mercantile structure to propel greater
specialization and a boom in trade. But even before that the reforms of 1688 propelled
institutional changes in the “spirit” of the economy that undergirded the expansion of
external commerce.
First, the revolution in the British fiscal state steadied the macroeconomy and laid the
foundations of a modern financial sector: since merchants relied on financial techniques
to conduct trade over long distances with credit, they gained. Second, a new and broader
franchise in parliament kept the legal and regulatory incursions of the state on business in
check, with contracts and banking activities free to develop, even after episodic financial
crises and downturns. Third, although the fiscal state required stronger tax tools, these
were not deployed as heavy tariffs in such a way as to crush trade; fiscal power did not
equate exactly with unbridled mercantilism in this sense. Tariffs could be kept low if
mercantilism was pursued by military means, by taking trade market share from rivals by
force—so as to expand the tax base rather than raising the tax rate. Fourth, another
centerpiece of mercantilism, the state-chartered trading companies were increasingly
exposed to competition as their “patents” expired. Government was over time less
inclined to view the concentration of trade in the hands of one privileged company as a
desirable arrangement, and in due course a large array of commercial ventures took6
shape, increasing competition, hence the quantity of trade and again, fortuitously, the
government’s tax base.
3
Thus I depict the early modern period, international and interregional trade was supported
by increasingly pro-commercial regimes, as shown in Figure 3. This was a fundamental
change in the political economy of the era, in the philosophical spirit of the age. There
were limits to this change, with only a gradual dissolution of the large state-sanctioned
monopoly ventures and the gradual rise of private commerce through smaller-scale
enterprises. In addition, even at this more competitive level, trade remained largely
canalized and often traveled under a given flag according to whichever navy controlled
the shipping lanes. Accordingly, trade expended—faster than population, and faster than
output—but it still remained small in the world as w whole. Whereas the spirit was now
somewhat willing, the flesh was still quite weak—shipping technology was such that the
benefits trade, for most commodities, did not outweigh the costs. The world trade routes
were mere skeletons compared to their current form, and only cheaper transportation
would add substantial flesh to those bones.
These developments set the springboard for globalization, but the big jump was yet to
come. As I discuss below, the dawn of the long nineteenth century brought an end to this
particular configuration of globalization. After the European powers reached a peace
treaty of 1815, the seas were open again to trade, backed now by very strong economic
and technological impulses. The Industrial Revolution implied specialization wherever it
spread—and equally, where it didn’t—as countries traded among themselves, exchanging
manufactures for primary products and vice versa. This was a fundamental international
division of labor that had not been seen before on such a scale, and it also heralded the
Great Divergence of incomes and productivity in the last two centuries.
Now the economic forces, the flesh in Figure 3, were aligned with the spirit, promoting a
boom in global economic interaction. Besides impelling countries to abandon notions of
self-sufficiency and embrace specialization via trade, the modern era also brought with it
technologies, such as steam power and the telegraph, that were bound to reduce the time
and cost of linking markets. Jointly, these fundamentals encouraged an amplification of
international linkages by an order of magnitude over what had been seen before, either
measured by convergence of prices or the surge in trade volumes.
The twentieth century, since 1914 at least, was a time when globalization went into
reverse and, depending on the location and markets in question, some if not all of the
gains of the nineteenth century were lost. Clearly, this was not due to our having
forgotten any of the important technological innovations that spurred trade; nor was it for
want of any new such innovations, since there were many, including internal combustion
engines, jet air transport, and advanced electronic communications.
All of the retreat in globalization can, of course, be attributed to the political and
institutional dimension of the diagram: a choice to stop the integration of markets given
                                                       
3 This paragraph draws extensively on the excellent survey by O’Brien (1998).7
the existing technological capacity to make them flourish, a weakening in the spirit of
globalization, so to speak. These limits on trade have been seen as a “backlash” although
their origins in two world wars can also be seen as the collateral damage of global
international conflicts in an era of total war. Either way, the historical process of
globalization has not been one of ever-closer union among countries, at least on this time-
scale.
Looking ahead, and beyond the twentieth-century experience, do we again face a choice
of whether to embrace or restrain globalization? To some degree we do. But can we
suppose, after several centuries of experience, that the forces that gradually coalesced to
make us traders at the local, national, and then global levels will ever go away? If the
genie is out of the bottle then economic globalization, in one form or another, is here to
stay. But how we manage it, for better or for worse, remains a crucial and ongoing
problem, a challenge that can be faced with greater confidence if we can remember, and
then learn from, our centuries of experience with these issues.
The Impulse to Trade: Globalization Past and Present
To justify the division of history implied by our schema we must first address two
overarching questions: What fundamental economic forces have led the world toward
globalization? And when did such forces begin to operate on a scale large enough to
make a difference? These questions matter not simply because they will focus our
attention on historical episodes that are globalized enough to be relevant for
contemporary comparison. By paying attention to historical eras in which globalization
did not exist, we can also identify key characteristics that restrain market integration and
mute its impact. Studying the latter type of scenario is likely to be helpful as we examine
some developing countries today which globalization seems to have passed by.
At a fundamental level, economic historians are concerned with the deep human impulse
to trade in all its forms: the desire to exchange goods, to imitate technology, to lend and
borrow, and to migrate. Archeological evidence reveals the commonly observed and age-
old proclivity of humans to “truck and barter”—in Adam Smith’s felicitous phrase. This
offers a flavor of the persistence of markets across vast expanses of time, but without
more detailed evidence on the extent of those markets across space, we remain ill
equipped to decide whether globalization has been a force for decades, centuries or
millennia.
When Did Globalization Begin?
It might seem surprising that such a debate is open in the historical literature, but between
repeated appeals to assertion and the difficulty of adducing archival evidence, we are
only recently getting to grips with this question. For the most part, however, the debate8
might be reasonably whittled down to a battle between three camps, or, equally, three
rival dates for the onset of a global economy.
4
Various scholars in the world history school posit a very early start date for globalization,
circa 1000. According to this view, overland and Mediterranean trade flourished in this
period, with caravans and coastal shipping linking Asian and European markets, and this
is enough to prove the existence of a world economy. A more conservative wing of the
world history school would lean toward circa 1500 (maybe even 1492, to be precise) as
the key date. This might seem more reasonable if one takes the view that a solution to the
economic disconnect between the Americas and the rest of the world is a sine qua non for
a global economy. Only following the voyages of discovery and the first
circumnavigation, expeditions which had at least a partial economic motive, could world
trade finally span the Old and New Worlds.
Yet just because such trading links existed does not, of course, imply that they mattered
fundamentally for economic outcomes. Indeed, early trade between these locations was
minuscule compared to the size of these economies, and compared to the commerce on
shorter routes such as the coastal European routes between the Atlantic, Mediterranean,
and Baltic entrepôts. High transport costs, inadequate finance and insurance, risks of
predation by pirates or potentates, and a fear of natural peril discouraged traders from
transoceanic arbitrage. Only a few fearless, foolish, or well-equipped private merchants
could flourish in such a setting. Of course, the newly emerging state-sponsored
multinational trading companies enjoyed smoother sailing under imperial protection. That
such trade existed at all, despite such risks and costs, speaks to the impulse to trade: the
divergence in the relative scarcity of goods in different locations. Thus, pepper, spices,
cottons, tea, coffee, and other luxury commodities were shipped out of Asia. Silver and
manufactures were sold by Europe. Sugar and tobacco were the principal exports of the
Americas.
Importantly, all these trades carried very high markups between export and import
markets, a gap in autarky prices that created a profit sufficient to offset all the costs of
transport and the risks. But the vast majority of goods had such low profit that they never
traded at all. A global economy could not be said to exist, say, on the basis of a few
luxury goods changing hands. These goods were a small fraction of the output of the
eastern economies, and in consumption they mattered only to a rich elite in Europe. In
both places, the vast majority of individuals lived near subsistence and they produced and
consumed food, clothing, and shelter that moved in a tightly delimited local orbit, and
certainly did not move at the global scale. Even as late as 1820, as measured in value
terms, about 99 percent of the goods produced in the world never entered trade at all
(Maddison 1995). Accordingly, we may follow recent scholarship in dating any
widespread impact of economic globalization—defined as economic interaction beyond
trade in a few goods and a small range of locations—as occurring sometime after 1800.
                                                       
4 This section draws on O’Rourke and Williamson (2002abc) and Findlay and O’Rourke (2002).9
With the Industrial Revolution all this was to change, though the direction of causation is
far from clear. After about 1800 we observe that countries did radically specialize in
manufactures or primary products, and use imports to meet consumption needs. The
process began with Britain, which became a net food importer early in the nineteenth
century, and spread to other industrializers. On the other hand, another group of countries
pursued comparative advantage in primary products, and supplied the industrializers with
food and raw materials. This division of the world was radically new and predicated on
exchange. It is a division whose legacy we still grapple with: the division of the world
into producers and exporters of different types of goods, into the nations of core and
periphery, and, with the accompanying Great Divergence, into nations rich and poor.
The Evidence
The evolution of world trade volumes speaks of this change in regime. Over the
nineteenth century the ratio of world trade to output had risen from less than two percent
to around 16 percent (see Figure 1, where the trade ratio is measured as exports plus
imports divided by output). Globally the growth rate of world trade volume had risen
from about 1% per annum in each of the 16
th, 17
th, and 18
th centuries to around 3% in
each of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since the growth rate of world output in
the nineteenth century was that much slower than in the twentieth century, it was during
the nineteenth century that the growth rate of trade-to-output ratios in the world reached
its all-time peak. By this measure, globalization as a broadly felt phenomenon arrived in
the nineteenth century.
5
Before 1800, just as the trade volumes were small, the large gaps in prices between
exporting and importing markets also attest to the very limited integration of world
markets in this earlier era. International commodity markets for Asian exports such as
coffee, cloves, and pepper showed consistent five-fold to twenty-fold differences between
the high European and low Asian prices from the 1580s to the 1820s. Only thereafter did
prices begin systematically to converge, bringing gaps into the 3:1 or 2:1 range. By 1900,
gaps of less than 100% and tending to zero were the norm (Figure 4).
In this respect the exotic high-value commodities joined in the same marked price
convergence during the late nineteenth century that was common to a much wider range
of primary products and manufactures (such as cotton, see Figure 5). Widespread
commodity price convergence is one definition of globalization, and this was one
correlate of the vast expansion in the range and volume of goods traded and the
international division according to comparative advantage that is a hallmark of the
modern world economy.
In the nineteenth century a twenty-fold expansion in world trade volumes, and a similar
decline in typical commodity price gaps, marked a break from the past. More formal
                                                       
5 The increase was more pronounced in those regions that were the earliest and most enthusiastic in
embracing the trading and specialization opportunities. British trade rose from 8% of GDP to 16% during
the 18
th century (Crafts 1985); and Western Europe as a whole experienced an increase from 10% to 16% in
the nineteenth century (Maddison 1995).10
quantitative analysis is needed on this regime change, but recent work confirms that the
nineteenth-century world economy was radically different from what went before in its
internal equilibrium allocation and price mechanisms.
6
Increasingly Britain and other industrial nations could “import” land—land embodied in
food imports—leaving the local economy free to pursue a logical specialization in
activities better suited to a land-scarce region. The typical quantitative equilibrium
characteristic of a closed economy thus began to be replaced with standard features found
in an open economy. Local factor prices were soon heavily influenced by world goods
market conditions  (O’Rourke, Taylor, and Williamson 1996).
The evidence points to the post-1800 period in world history as the era when the forces of
globalization were truly unleashed. This is also the era that coincides with the rapid
acceleration in living standards associated with “modern economic growth” following the
Industrial Revolution. The coincidence of these two events warrants further discussion
below, but for now we just note that the same problems of interpretation affect both
phenomena.
Scholars studying the Industrial Revolution have argued incessantly about how it
happened, even whether it happened, and, especially, why it happened when and where it
did. The “revolutionary” and “evolutionary” views of the Industrial Revolution argue not
only about the size of the break from the past, but also the nature of causation. Was there
a unique confluence of events found in Britain circa 1760 that made industrialization
happen? Or were centuries of economic, political, legal, social, and institutional changes
responsible in a drawn-out chain of cumulative causation?
7
These same issues should lead us to consider a very broad sweep of time as we seek to
identify the foundations of today’s international integration. As we study globalization in
history, and even as we recognize the importance of dates like 1492 and 1815, an
allowance for cumulative causation requires us to also seek out important interstitial
developments between the benchmark dates. In this way we can glean evidence on the
full set of ingredients that, in periods and places when they were properly assembled,
have allowed globalization to flourish so rapidly at certain times in the last two centuries.
An obvious lesson from the last millennium for today’s policymakers in developing
countries is that progress can be slow. Single cases of reform, or isolated institutional
changes do not seem to have made for a dramatic switch for or against globalization in
past eras. Rather the slow accrual of various fundamentals laid the basis for an expansion
of trade, and the benefits that could derive from it, as we describe in the next section.
                                                       
6 For example, econometric evidence shows that in a country such as Britain, internal factor prices became
de-linked from local factor supplies, in particular the supposedland constraint that scared Malthusians so
much (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002c).
7 The cumulative view favors a study of diverse pre-industrial developments such as the Magna Carta, the
Glorious Revolution, the patent system, the enclosure movement, the stock and bond markets, and the
like—events and features that spread over time, but eventually come together as a complete foundation for
growth.11
History is relevant here in that many of these same fundamentals seem to be still lacking
in many developing countries even today.
Institutional Hurdles: Making a World Safe for Trade
Cutting a Deal and the Risks of Trade
An economic impulse to trade is not enough to get globalization started. With few local
exceptions, trade does not occur in a vacuum. This is especially clear today in many
developing countries, and it was true in the past in all pre-modern economies. Of course,
the form and extent of institutional development will strongly influence the level of trade,
if any, that can be supported.
For example, starting an import-export business requires more than just a profitable
arbitrage opportunity between two locations. Along the way, in each place, one might
need to legally incorporate the business, complete paperwork, satisfy regulations, employ
the legal or customary currencies in use, and pay taxes and tariffs. Trade is thus is
embedded in a variety of institutional structures: legal, social, and political. Some
examples help to introduce the issues and motivate our look back at history.
Consider first the problem of contract-based exchange. Many developing countries today
have poor legal and contractual bases for economic exchange, such that it is extremely
difficult to trade anonymously, with new counterparties, at a distance, or when payment
is delayed. We can recognize precursors to this problem in the medieval trade of the
Mediterranean. There traders often had to work across spatially and institutionally
separate entities such as the major city-states and ports of Italy like Genoa, Naples, and
Venice. Even within a city, legal shortcomings might mean that trade was not protected
as well as it is under modern systems of commercial law. But between political units the
extent of supranational standards and enforcement was practically nonexistent. Given
such obstacles, how then could the beginnings of a world economy be traced to this
period?
Recent research has emphasized that in this era important private-sector institutional
developments could support some trade in equilibrium, though not necessarily the
optimal level of trade (Greif 1993 and forthcoming; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994).
This strand of new institutional history focuses our attention via game theory on the
emergence of self-enforcing and incentive-compatible relationships between actors that
can allow some of the gains from trade to be materialized. With sufficient gains at stake,
trade may be supported subject to the existence of adequate and credible punishments of
defectors (e.g., in the event of deviations like default). Even in dispersed commercial
networks such as the Maghribi traders studied by Greif, the value of reputation and the
presence of reliable enough communications, could allow traders to sanction those guilty
of malfeasance and enforce contractual honesty to some degree.
On the one hand, then, this is an optimistic lesson from history for present-day scenarios
in which the fear, at least for the pro-global school of thought, is that many poor nations12
today might miss out on the benefits of globalization, through political malfunction or
geographic isolation or infrastructural malaise. If trade simply passes them by they will
never connect to the world economy and gain any of the presumed benefits of trade.
Despite such obstacles, history suggests they may still gain some of the benefits: some
trade can occur even when institutions are weak. On the other hand, an equally
distinguished branch of institutional history warns that although such trade may exist, it is
likely to be far from optimal in the absence of a strong state that can offer better
institutional foundations for exchange. In a paradox, despite the need for such strength on
the part of the state, the state must be assumed not to predate on trade, but rather support
it.
8
Economic historians and political scientists focus on this issue because of the shifting
locus of power in medieval and early modern states. It is of interest for our purpose
because changes in the political center of gravity have often accompanied changes in
legal, regulatory, or ownership patterns that affect important economic units engaged in
trade. Scholars have noted, for example, the important limits placed on the crown as
being instrumental in promoting private economic activity. We include here the
willingness of a less mercantilist state to permit freer trade without high tariffs or tight
customs control, to exercise fiscal rectitude and limit erratic economic policies, or to
support a banking and financial system and develop financial markets.
The history of the developments in trade and finance can be traced back many centuries.
And whilst the process illustrates again the rapid changes in some of the costs associated
with trade, the institutional changes along the way could not have taken place without a
change in the political economy of these countries’ economic systems.
This change in the “spirit” of the process I align with the realization by some states, at
least the successful ones, that a mutually beneficial relationship with merchant trade and
finance was an essential component in the domestic and, even more, the international
success of the polity. We have remarked on this above as regards the impact on trade; but
the feedback on the strength of the polity was the payback. As documented by Ferguson
(2001), it is hard to deny that it was financial acumen by the political leaders, as much a
technological prowess by industrialists, that helped put the British state in an imperial
leadership role in the nineteenth century.
Most historical literature focuses on the domestic impact of such institutional change, but
we may infer that such changes, if they mattered domestically, also breathed life into
international commerce. Such linkages may be inferred, for example, in the extent to
which capital market activity linking London and Amsterdam grew shortly after the
Glorious Revolution with the founding of the modern stock exchanges. Such institutions
laid important foundations for the commercial supremacy of the Dutch and British
empires, and underscore the point that the crown’s ambition may have been served in the
                                                       
8 Various theorists have studied the nature of such state formation, and under what conditions a benificent
or predatory state may emerge from anarchy or banditry (Olson 2000; Moselle and Polak 2001). Depending
on the relative power of different interest groups within the polity, such a state may take on different
institutional forms, for example with respect to legal structure (Glaeser and Shleifer 2000).13
larger sense through important self-restraint with respect to the abuse of some key
economic entities (North and Weingast 1989; O’Brien 1995; Dickson 1967; Neal 1990).
Trade Follows Finance? The Problems of Payments and Currencies
An institutional innovation such as the self-restraint of the state was keenly lacking in
many pre-modern economies, and still today in some of the world’s poorest countries,
and, without it, it is hard to know how much trade can be supported. Yet even with this
public good provided, it is still a long leap actually to put in place all of the other public




In those eras many of today’s developed countries grappled with key macroeconomic
problems of monetary and fiscal stability and the operation of capital markets. Only
through some painful experiences were these challenges confronted. These issues may
have once seemed only indirectly related to trade, but they are now considered
fundamental. For developing countries today, stabilization and credit rehabilitation are
the short-term goals in any crisis management scenario, and without such a platform to
enable basic economic functions to be served, talk of a trade strategy seems premature.
What are the essential components of a good financial system that can support not only
domestic economic activity, but exploit international gains from trade? Five key
ingredients have been identified by Rousseau and Sylla (2002):
•   sound public finance, an end in itself, but also historically one of the precursors to a
broad-based financial systems—an active and reputable government bond market
tending to pre-date the development of commercial debt and securities markets;
•   a stable money, since the retardation of financial systems often results from a volatile
and unreliable currency, as nominal contracting becomes ever riskier;
•   the development of banks and banking, which soundly expand the narrow money
base into a broader credit supply by their well-chosen use of leverage in the
transformation of assets;
•   the establishment of a sound central bank, which regulates the money supply and
monitors the banking sector, and also creates payment clearing functions; and
•   the evolution of securities markets, in which specialized institutions such as
investment banks intermediate in equity and debt markets.
Such a combination of factors is indeed rare, limited to only a few developed economies
today. And as late as 1914, it could be argued that only six economies had succeeded in
all these dimensions: Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, France, Germany, and
Japan. But whilst this association is usually pointed to as support for the finance-growth
nexus, we may see it also as support for the idea that finance can promote trade. All of
the countries mentioned above were significant players in the world trade of the late14
nineteenth century, and narrative histories that recount how they arrived at that position
emphasize the ties between commercial and financial activity that placed a high
probability on such an outcome.
One may look back to the early Renaissance with the rise of deposit banks in Florence,
and the first use of paper as a substitute for gold coin by merchants. Once these
instruments became negotiable, like primitive checks, they vastly simplified trade by
removing the need to carry inconvenient metals that were an invitation to theft. These
bills of exchange then reached the wider market for trade in Europe and the world via the
spread of this innovation to the banks of Amsterdam and London, the ports and financial
centers that handled a very large share of world trade at that time.
As the British economy became dominant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and
as London emerged as the principal world financial center, the sterling bill rose to
prominence as the world standard for international payments in trade. At the same time,
financial complexity grew with the development of larger banks (such as the Wisselbank
in Amsterdam or the Bank of England in London), bond markets (an innovation of a
British government desperate for war finance), stock exchanges (Amsterdam and London
circa 1680), and complicated financial derivative products (options were created less than
a decade after the London stock exchange opened in the 1680s).
In the political economy of this symbiotic relationship between trade and finance, the
market endorses the state as much as vice versa. Perhaps the most transparent and most
debated of all of the financial markets’ ways of “disciplining” governments remains via
the currency market. An old tradition in the economic history literature here points to the
role of a commitment to stable money, usually taken to mean the gold standard in the
nineteenth century, as a way for governments to earn reputational benefits. As Bordo and
Rockoff (1996) have demonstrated, the effect of joining gold was usually to lower
country risk, thus boosting investment from overseas and promoting growth. Although
gold no longer exists as a “currency standard,” the same macroeconomic stability criteria
still guide bond spreads in today’s capital market, so that exchange-rate floaters (and the
many clandestine fixers) need to pay attention to essentially the same monetary and fiscal
policy fundamentals.
9
There may be other beneficial results of choices that condition macroeconomic policy in
an open economy environment. Just as a “currency standard” might have capital market
spillovers, so too it might promote trade. As recent work by Rose (2000) and others has
shown, common currencies appear to be highly significant explanators of higher trade
volumes in contemporary data, boosting trade by a factor of 3 or more ceteris paribus in
a gravity-model setting. Can such a large impact be believed?
                                                       
9 Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) expand the Bordo-Rockoff methodology to a broader  sample of countries and
time periods, including the interwar. They find that reputations were hard to build in the sense that country
risk is highly persistent. On the other hand, the persistence drops greatly after 1914, suggesting that
reputation was then frittered away; the interwar gold standard was, as many have suspected, a different
animal than its prewar cousin, with considerably less confidence in the system shown by markets (and,
history shows, rightly so).15
Historical data supply helpful corroboration here. Studies of trade and the gold standard
can explore this currency-trade relationship for the significant core and periphery
economies of the globalized late-nineteenth-century economy.
10 The results indicate still
large common-currency effects on trade. Joining the gold standard from 1870 to 1914
might have boosted trade by 30%–50% ceteris paribus, and by a similar amount even in
the 1920s, which is arguably a much more reasonable magnitude than the factor of 200%
posited by Rose.
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This brief tour of history allows us to focus on a few points of economic significance.
Public finance, and its intersection with money and fiscal policy, sets the institutional
stage for international as well as domestic market transactions. Institutional change that
buttresses these areas can promote growth and trade. Such institutional change might be
self-strengthening, or it could be self-sacrificial, or self-disciplining, as in the case of
adherence to new policy rules. A most attractive “hand-tying” exercise in the late
nineteenth century relied on such a sacrifice to be rewarded by “network externality”
property of the global payments system. As with a software standard, once many agents
are using a particular money, everyone else will want to use the same money too to lower
their transaction costs and boost trade.
Empirical evidence suggests that trade and macroeconomic policies deeply intersect on
this issue and trends in recent regional and global initiatives show that the compatibility
of trade and macro-finance policies is starting to be taken seriously. Fixed exchange rates
are not a panacea, but the narrative evidence on the importance of currency standards like
the sterling bill in early modern trade, and then the econometric evidence on the classical
gold standard and contemporary common currencies, suggest that currencies do matter.
Such imperatives guided the economic case for European Monetary Union, and
developing countires will likely explore similar options as time goes on.
Input Trade Strategies: Do-It-Yourself Comparative Advantage?
In this section I turn to developments in the modern era and those extensions of
globalization and trade that, from an historical point of view, might have mattered most
for long-run economic outcomes. I take here an unusual line in that I am not going to
focus on trade in final goods at all.
In some sense, this emphasis derives from a conviction that the growth-promoting effects
of goods trade have been explored in endless research during the last decade, and with
                                                       
10 A serious objection to contemporary studies notes their reliance on a small and obscure subset of
“common currency” areas in current data to generate the result (e.g. countries in the CFA Franc zone in
West Africa). The inference on historical data is likely to be much more robust concerning the effects on
large economies, and cleaner given that trade was less distorted by tariff and nontariff barriers.
11 See Eichengreen and Irwin (1995); Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003); and López-Córdova and
Meissner (forthcoming).16
little agreement about the result.
12 From another vantage point it also proves to be very
difficult to find any strong consensus in the historical literature concerning the impact of
trade barriers on growth, absent a few recent noteworthy contributions. And even there
the effects seem to often run quite counter to conventional wisdom.
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Given that the jury is still out on the question of whether protection of final goods was
bad for growth, I choose to emphasize two areas where history seems to have very
powerful stories to tell about constraints to growth posed by the immobility not of goods,
but of factors. Conventional theories of trade and growth tell us that the availability of
intermediate inputs will matter for allocation, specialization, and accumulation. These
issues in one form or another face developing countries today, but they also stood as a
challenge to many economies during the last era of globalization a century ago.
The Resource Trade: The End of Geography?
Globalization implies that more and more economic objects become mobile: goods in
trade, people through migration, and investment via the capital market. For a long time,
however, geography could still dictate the structure of economic organization at some
level because one fundamental set of inputs—natural resources such as agricultural land,
forestry, minerals, ores, and fuels—remained immobile even as almost everything else
became transportable. Naturally, this has led to many speculations as to the geographic
determinants of economic activity in general, and the Industrial Revolution in particular.
According to an overly simplified version of this story, Europe, and especially countries
like Britain, Germany, and France, were destined to industrialize because they were lucky
enough to have the relevant raw materials, like coal and iron ore, on hand (Landes 1969;
Jones 1981; Pomeranz 2000).
The later nineteenth century, however, provides us with a better range of data to formally
test such a proposition. By examining disaggregated data on imports and exports, Wright
(1990) was able to expose the resource-rich content of U.S. net exports during the period
1880 to 1930. This was a crucial finding, since it was at this time that the U.S. entered a
rapid growth spurt, overtaking Britain and all other nations in terms of productivity and
income per capita, and the sources of that spectacular growth demand explanation. The
logic here is that a resource-led switch to industrial activity (despite a historic
comparative advantage in primary products) allowed the U.S. to specialize in products
with faster total-factor-productivity (TFP) growth potential.
                                                       
12 The case that openness promotes growth was made by numerous papers, best known being Sachs and
Warner (1995). For a skeptical view, particularly on the question of whether we really a good measure
openness, and whether it correlates with growth, see the response of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000).
13 For example, Vamvakidis (1997) found that economic growth in the early twentieth century was
positively related to tariffs, controlling for other determinants; and O’Rourke (2000) found the same for the
late nineteenth century in a small sample of countries. The consensus within economic history seems to be
that these are puzzling and provocative results that warrant much more attention as we seek to confirm their
robustness. Nonetheless, for now they confirm the older assertions of Bairoch (1972) that from a
nineteenth-century perspective it is hard to argue that tariffs were bad for growth, especially when one
considers the impressive performance in that era of such protectionist bastions as the United States.17
In the background here is a story of specialization driven by factor endowments, in the
usual Heckscher-Ohlin style. Is such an assumption justified? The Heckscher-Ohlin
theory has never worked that well when tested as a factor-content-of-trade model, but an
extended, albeit indirect test of this kind of Wright’s hypothesis was put forward by
Estevadeordal and Taylor (2002). In the late nineteenth century, for a sample of 18
countries, they show that it was only for natural resources (both land and minerals) that
the Heckscher-Ohlin theory fit reasonably well, whereas the fit was poor for labor and
capital (see Figure 6). We can take this as a sign that resources were an important
determinant of comparative advantage globally and not just in the United States.
However, already by the dawn of the twentieth century this argument was losing steam.
Even resource endowments began to overcome the “tyranny of distance” that had pinned
them down for so long. By the mid-to-late twentieth century, the lowered cost of
transportation for raw materials fostered a group of Newly Industrializing Countries that
had very little in the way of the necessary local resource endowments. Vast chunks of
Australian terra firma are now shipped to countries such as Japan (since a major postwar
trade treaty in the 1950s) and (later) to the East Asian NICs on bulk carriers. Mineral ores
from remote outback regions like the Kimberley and Pilbarra now supply foreign steel
plants with a vital input, and prove that, in our day and age, even mountains can be
moved.
But this trade is not so universal that we can declare that resource endowments don’t
matter any more. In practice, they do, because not every country has established either
the required infrastructure or the necessary free commercial policy to reduce domestic
resource prices to “world” levels. Geography surely matters. For example, a landlocked
country will be hard-pressed to access Australian ore imports as easily as Japan and the
East Asian NICs did in the last fifty years: all those countries were fortunate enough to
have developed have deep-water ports. Thus the significance of the “landlocked dummy”
in many growth and gravity model equations seems entirely reasonable, even as we
recognize that with appropriate transport developments via infrastructure investment even
this constraint can be broken. Ceteris paribus, such investments would not be efficient,
but given the extremely low levels of development in poor landlocked countries (and the
attendant low wages) such developments could be beneficial, provided the right
institutional setting is achieved.
Why should this matter for long-run outcomes? In a static model it won’t, but in a
dynamic model, specialization can matter for growth if countries can be “trapped” in
slow-growing sectors by comparative advantage. Models such as that of Matsuyama
(1992) formalize this process. In that case the intuition is that only one sector (call it
“industry”) has positive learning-by-doing externalities. The other (call it “agriculture”)
doesn’t. In that setting, any factor—an agricultural revolution, a commercial policy
distortion, a scarcity of minerals, an abundance of land—that promotes resources to shift
out of manufactures will harm long-run growth.
14
                                                       
14 Of course, these kinds of results are “built in”: they follow from an assumption that the sectors are
asymmetric, and an endogenous growth process only exists in one and not both.18
The Capital Goods Trade: An Import-Led Growth Strategy?
The other type of input trade that history has a great deal to say about is trade in capital
goods. One strand of the recent growth literature has recognized that capital goods may
be an important channel for determining growth outcomes. De Long and Summers (1991)
posited the existence of differential returns for equipment investment across countries
arising from differences in commercial policies and other distortions. This finding was
embedded in a model by Jones (1994) where distortions on capital goods act as a tax on
accumulation, and hence slow growth, and an example was made of India. The detailed
econometrics of the price-investment nexus were explored by Taylor (1994; 1998ab)
using the postwar price-distortion policies in Argentina as a key exemplum. In such
cases, tariff policies, if they protect capital goods more than other goods (e.g.
consumption goods) can create a high relative price of capital, defined as [PK/PY] the
price of capital goods relative to GDP. This will, in turn, bias the user cost of capital
upwards: even for the same interest rate, a project must yield a higher output stream to
compensate for the expensive capital inputs that must be purchased locally.
Some of the variation in capital goods prices could certainly be attributed to reverse
causation (low productivity) coupled with the non-tradability of capital goods (structures,
for example). Still, Taylor (1998b) showed that in a cross section of countries, much of
the variation in [PK/PY] could be explained by commercial policy and capital controls, as
proxied by policy measures such as tariffs and black-market premia. This finding is
consistent with a view that much capital equipment is tradable (and not just machinery
and equipment—even the erecting of structures can be open to bidding from foreign
firms).
Recent research that applies these insights to the last great era of globalization, only
serves to strengthen this perspective on growth with tradable capital inputs. Collins and
Williamson (1999) found great variation in capital goods prices from 1870 to 1939, and
used these data in a similar fashion to the postwar studies to see whether capital goods
prices could explain variations in investment ratios and growth. Indeed they did, and the
association proves to be robust in earlier epochs. An increase of 10% in capital goods
prices could lower investment ratios by roughly 5 percentage points, a large impact.
To make this point more tangible, let us consider one of the famous cases of development
“failure” from this period even within the OECD, namely Australia. Once perhaps the
richest economy in the world (if Maddison’s data are to be believed), by the mid to late
twentieth century this country had experienced negative growth relative to the OECD as a
whole, and compared to the U.S. in the lead. Indeed, such was the concern over this
falling back that some commentators feared an Argentine-style outcome, with regression
to middle-income status (Duncan and Fogarty 1984).
In a recent paper, McLean and Taylor (2001) examined some features of the Australian
case, and one fact that stands out is the coincidence of retardation from circa 1914 with a
rapid increase in relative capital prices, especially as compared with other OECD
countries. Figure 7 shows this change quite dramatically, and indicates that the origins of
the trend can be traced back to the 1890s, a time when Australia embarked on import-19
substituting industrialization with aggressive use of tariff policy. By the 1920s and 1930s,
the tariff’s effects were compounded by the increase in global protectionism, leaving
Australia, with no comparative advantage in machinery and equipment, facing capital
goods prices that had increased by perhaps 50% as compared to the United States.
This kind of analysis of the dynamic effects of trade policy is now beginning to influence
policymaking. A noteworthy recent example would be the recent decision of then
Argentine finance minister Domingo Cavallo to eliminate tariffs of capital goods and
raise them on consumer goods in an attempt to reinvigorate the depressed Argentine
economy.
15 Most likely, this policy has been overtaken for the moment by events such as
the fiscal crisis of the state and the default. It will be interesting to see whether this kind
of plan will inspire imitators elsewhere. If so, then policy reforms that explicitly
recognize the different static and dynamic tradeoffs in the protection of consumption and
capital goods could be an important area in years ahead, although it remains to be seen
what kind of institutional embedding will make such changes possible.
And The Winner Is…? A Long View of Political Economy and Trade
Trading Up or Trading Down? Globalization and Inequality
Trade, according to an old pedagogical device, is best thought of as just another
technology. A production process in a factory turns inputs into outputs. But so does trade:
we put in exports, and what comes out are imports. But like any technology, trade is
subject to constant change, shifts that can benefit some countries more than others, and
some individuals more than others. A new mechanized way to produce textiles upset the
Luddites (and had them breaking machines in protest); but the same irritations would
have accompanied (indeed, do accompany) the sudden arrival of cheap textiles not from a
new-fangled device, but simply out of the machinery of trade.
Similar technological analogies for globalization forces could easily be built around shifts
in other markets, be it outflows of capital (the “giant sucking sound” made famous by
Ross Perot) or inflows of immigrants (demonized for economic impacts as well as out of
racial, ethnic, or cultural bias). But what are the facts? When we look at the views of
either side, how accurate is their picture historically? History offers some neglected, but
relevant case studies.
For example, in the nineteenth century, beginning with the repeal of the Corn Laws in
Europe, the free trade movement was a radical populist movement. It sought to release
Old World working classes from low wages and high food prices (and symmetrically, to
“release” landlords from low labor costs and high land rents). Labor exported itself from
glutted markets, either literally (by migration) or implicitly (in labor-intensive goods
                                                       
15 This plan was explicitly intended to boost investment and hence growth, and attract foreign
capital—exactly as the above academic research papers had argued. It was a radical plan, and not without
problems since it required unilateral actions that conflicted with Mercosur commitments. Nonetheless,
domestic interests have prevailed and restarting growth was seen to trump free trade area agreements.20
exports); in the opposite direction cheap food flooded in from the New World, an implicit
import of land embodied in goods. As wages, rents, and prices adjusted, real incomes of
rich and poor converged. The other side to the story, of course, is that opposite effects
obtained in the trading partners. Ceteris paribus, New World wages had to decline and
land rents rise, as income-distribution effects working in the reverse direction (O’Rourke
and Williamson 1999).
For some guidance on whether the major shifts in globalization and trade have had any
temporal or causal association with inequality, we may turn to a recent comprehensive
survey paper by Lindert and Williamson (2002). These authors find that global inequality
between individuals has increased over time since circa 1800, as shown in Figure 8.
However, all of this change is accounted for by the rise in international rather than
intranational inequality. That is, the Great Divergence of national economic outcomes
has had much more to do with global inequality than have any within-country effects of
changing economic factors over 200 years.
Admittedly, the data underlying these results is highly fragmentary and fragile, especially
the attempt to compute global and national income distributions before 1950, and,
especially, before 1900. Though built on heroic assumptions, this is still an original and
important exercise in data collection and agglomeration. If we take it at face value, then
the main result is, in and of itself, enough to cast doubt on many of the presumed
channels through which today’s critics imagine globalization exacerbates within-country
inequality.
For example, if the Heckscher-Ohlin framework has validity, we should see large
changes in factor rewards and hence inequality, whenever there is a major change in
trading regime, for different countries have great variation in endowments. Even an
allowance for differing technology levels between countries is entirely consistent with
this result (Trefler 1993). Yet the vast ups and downs in world trade integration over 200
years (Figure 1), and the steady long run trend toward higher trade volumes, appear to be
little correlated with shifts in within-country income distributions (Figure 8).
Similarly, we could construct arguments based on the rise and fall of international capital
flows and labor migration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to suggest that within-
country inequality ought to have been disturbed by linkages in these markets too—when
they functioned well before 1914 and when they didn’t for most of the mid-twentieth
century. Yet, again, the correlation isn’t there. World within-country inequality did not
systematically rise in the last great age of globalization, then fall during the twentieth
century anti-global reaction, and then rise again. Simply put, the relationship between
globalization and inequality (and certainly between trade and inequality) isn’t that direct
or clear cut.
There are two possible reactions to the basic evidence. One is to believe that the linkage
from trade to inequality is weak or nonexistent. This, I would argue, is an erroneous
conclusion. The forces appear to be quite strong and statistically significant in well-
focused historical studies that examine econometrically the links between changes in the
terms of trade and change in domestic factor prices. For example, the effects appear to be21
strong for both the developed and developing world in the late nineteenth century
(O’Rourke, Taylor, and Williamson 1996; Williamson 2002). It might just be that these
effects, though very strong, are simply swamped in quantitative significance by changes
in between-country inequality, namely the Great Divergence. That is principally the
message we can take from Figure 8.
A second conclusion might be, instead, to doubt the extent to which globalization has
actually been allowed to proceed to its fullest extent. Perhaps trade would change global
inequality if allowed to proceed without barriers, but as yet we may doubt that it has been
permitted to reach that level. Those areas of the world that did participate in the
globalization of the pre-1914 era did find very radical shifts in income distribution driven
by trade. In the New World, land rents rose as the land was embodied in food and
exported. In Europe, the exact opposite forces were at work when the food arrived. In the
former case, landowners gained, but in the latter they faced large losses in income.
Since we are concerned in this essay with the potential implications of globalization for
developing countries we need to ask what specific historical precedents there are for this
Heckscher-Ohlin story. It should not be imagined that such experience was limited only
to a few rich countries participating in the global economy of the late 19
th century.
Similar impacts of trade on income distribution were seen in both labor-rich and labor-
scarce developing countries of that era, in the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin
America. In a labor abundant country, such as Thailand, for example, opening up to the
world economy meant that the poorest laborers gained enormously as compared to the
owners of scarce land, implying a dramatic leveling of the country’s income distribution
(Williamson 2002).
The lesson here is that when globalization forces operate, whilst in some countries they
may have egalitarian impacts, in other countries they may have inegalitarian impacts
(Wood 1994). However, if one can move beyond the artificial confines of a nation-state
view of the world, the bottom line should be clear. Overall, globalization is one of the
few forces that has offset global inequality for 200 years, with trade and factor markets
allowing identical factors a better chance of earning the same reward in spatially separate
locations. Those rewards might have diverged even further had spillovers from the Great
Divergence in technology levels been kept more closely confined within the borders of
the rich countries, yet there too global technology transfer, though imperfect and
incomplete, has prevented even starker inequality; and its mechanisms undoubtedly rely
on imitation and adaptation though trade links and inward investment.
Yet what might seem like good news from a global utilitarian point of view does not, of
course, translate into a simple local or regional embrace of open economy policies.
Policies are driven by the political economy of nation states, and even should free trade
be beneficial, it will not be offer a Pareto improvement in welfare terms without
redistribution. If such compensation is imperfect, winning coalitions (or minority but
powerful lobbies) might be able to block any shift to more open policies.
History shows that such distributional conflicts can be a serious obstacle to trade, even
under the most sympathetic circumstances. In Continental Europe, powerful landed22
interests were resistant to the “grain invasion” from the New World and successfully
fought for protection, as compared to the liberal tradition in England where the landed
class was once and for all defeated with the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s. In the
New World, owners of the abundant land resource generally could push for lower trade
barriers in polities where their voices dominated political discourse (e.g., the United
States South or Argentina) as compared to where it didn’t (e.g., the United States North
or Australia). Outcomes usually reflected this voice, the sectional clash of economic
interests in the United States being a vivid intra-national example of such conflict where
the battle lines were clearly drawn (Rogowski 1989).
History thus illuminates the challenges we face today, challenges that are more acute now
that the “safety valve” of migration is largely closed off. Trade might ease inequality in
poor countries if it allows abundant low-skilled labor an out, but it could have the
opposite effect on income differentials in rich countries when that unskilled labor floods
in. The trade-off depends on your world-view, whether you have a nationalistic or a
global concern for income distribution or other economic objectives. The impacts also
spell out clear policies to offset inequitable effects in richer countries, where low-skill
workers face the severest competition from workers in developing countries: policies
should aim to educate, train, or otherwise lift skill levels to differentiate local from
foreign workers.
As Figure 8 shows, the far more important determinant of one’s relative income level is
not globalization per se, but rather the Great Divergence. The impacts of the Heckscher-
Ohlin forces, history suggests, are in the long run of a much smaller magnitude than the
massive spreads due levels of total-factor-productivity (TFP), or “technology” as we
commonly say. This historically-informed perspective ought to be central to the
globalization debate, but it only infrequently surfaces in political discourse, perhaps most
famously in the 1994 Perot-Gore debate over NAFTA on CNN’s Larry King Live. Perot
protested that U.S. workers were doomed because Mexican workers earned a wage one-
fifth as high. Gore, obviously primed for that point, shot back that there was nothing to
fear at all because Mexican workers were only one-fifth as productive as American
workers.
Not merely a talk-show sound-bite, this observation captures an enduring feature of the
world economy. We know that fundamental differences in raw worker productivities are
a long-standing, ineluctable, feature of the world economy. As Clark (1993) has shown,
in 1910 one U.S. textile worker could work as effectively as 1.5 British workers or 6
Indian or Chinese workers. Open trade will make some marginal differences here, but it
will not, say, reduce U.S. wage levels to LDC levels and the technology-augmented
Heckscher-Ohlin model shows why (Trefler 1993).
Whether globalization broadly construed will lead to convergence in these worker
efficiency levels, and whether trade might be one of its channels remains to be seen. How
large a role can trade play? One way to put an upper bound on that is to imagine trade
acting as a perfect substitute for factor market integration, and to ask what such
integration would imply. We know in reality that it is a much less than perfect substitute23
(Collins, O’Rourke, and Williamson 1999), but suppose that the thought experiment
stands.
Globalization in factor markets, albeit imperfect, could take us part way toward
convergence, since differences in physical/human capital intensity are substantial across
countries. Yet, according to Hall and Jones (1999), in the language of “Ak” models, the
differences in technology (“A”) still account for two thirds of international divergence,
and differences capital intensity in (“k”) for only one third. Other place even greater
emphasis on “A” (Easterly and Levine 1999).
16 Since, to some degree, k is endogenous,
given A, this might underestimate the role of “factor convergence” versus “productivity
convergence.” Several scholars find evidence of both forces working equally strongly for
the OECD (Milbourne 1995; Dowrick and Rogers 2001). If these forces were unleashed
at a global level at least some of the Great Divergence might finally start to reverse. If
trade is a channel for this, or even for transmitting technology convergence, then global
inequality may owe more to the lack of trade than to its presence.
Convergence Postponed in the Twentieth Century: Detour or Portent?
Compared to the very long-run trends in globalization, we can see what an historical
aberration twentieth-century economic experience has been: the only sustained period in
the last several centuries when trends in the growth of world trade, and globalization
more generally, were put into reverse.
Some authors like Polanyi (1944) could write half a century ago with great conviction
that indeed we had entered a new age when the global markets would play second fiddle
to the state. Now, that statement appears premature, since the very forces that unleashed
trade—the economic impulse, the institutional foundations, the technological
advances—seem quite durable, even after some of the most disruptive global political
shocks history has ever seen. Instead, as we look back on the last century it could be seen
as a major hiatus, where the gradual unification of the world economy was put on hold.
Yet, even if technological fundamentals are in place, such as efficient transport
infrastructure or essential legal institutions, political will is needed too. The first era of
globalization began in an era of highly unrepresentative government, if we look at the
world as a whole (Figure 9). Did this make the process any easier? Can today’s
democratically chosen governments afford the long view? If the gains from trade are
there, and the winners adequately compensate the losers in the short run, one might think
so. But the history of trade as a development strategy is the story of an evolving process,
where winners may appear later, losers perhaps earlier, and the payoffs to innovation may
be slow and contingent.
All these factors are at odds with planning horizons dictated more by politics and popular
opinion in the short run. That being said, the return toward a more globalized system in
                                                       
16 In an “Ak” model income per capita is y=Ak, where A is “technology” and k is a measure of composite
capital (physical and human) per person. Crucially, all such inputs are accumulable, and show no
diminishing returns.24
recent years also parallels a rise in representative government, so at the level of raw
correlation these problems do not appear overwhelming so far, though the political
tensions “on the street” are increasingly palpable.
As the twenty-first century opens we seem close to rejoining, at least in some areas, the
trend towards global integration that lasted for several centuries before 1913. This is not
to say that a future detour, another serious setback to globalization, will not appear. Yet
the past gives us some warnings as to the kind of events that may trigger such a backlash,
from geopolitical conflicts and distrust, to economic policies that disregard inclusion by
focusing on the winners from globalization and neglecting the losers. We know that our
flesh (the technological basis for trade) is strong; our only doubt should be over whether
the spirit (the institutional bases determined by political economy) will be allowed to
weaken once again.
A successful transition to a globalized world promises more individual freedom,
economic and otherwise, and greater opportunities for all in the end, but how we get there
from here presents plenty of pitfalls. History tells us how costly distractions can be, but
also how and why we should guard against them.25
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Figure 3
All of Globalization and History on One Diagram
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Figure 5
Freight Rates on Cotton, Egypt and U.S. to the Britain, 1870–1914
Source: O’Rourke and Williamson (2002b).34
Figure 6
Resources and Comparative Advantage circa 1910
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Figure 8
Global Inequality Since 1800
Source: Lindert and Williamson (2002).37
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